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Cybersecurity and Distributed Energy Resources

July 9, 2020





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The USAID-NREL Partnership

USAID and NREL partner to deliver clean, reliable, and affordable power to the developing world. The USAID-NREL Partnership addresses critical aspects of deploying advanced energy systems in developing countries through:

- Policy, planning, and deployment support.
- Global technical toolkits.

www.nrel.gov/usaid-partnership

Global Technical Platforms

The USAID-NREL Partnership's global technical platforms provide free, state-of-the-art support on common and critical challenges to scaling up advanced energy systems.



www.re-explorer.org



www.greeningthegrid.org



www.i-jedi.org




www.resilient-energy.org



Resilient Energy Platform

Developed through the USAID-NREL Partnership, the Resilient Energy Platform provides expertly curated resources, training materials, tools, and technical assistance to enhance power sector resilience.

The platform enables decision makers to assess power sector vulnerabilities, identify resilience solutions, and make informed decisions to enhance power sector resilience at all scales.



www.resilient-energy.org

Agenda

Opening



Jeremy Foster
Senior Energy
Advisor,
USAID

Cybersecurity and Distributed Energy Resources



Maurice Martin
Senior
Cybersecurity
Research
Leader,
NREL



Tami Reynolds
Project Manager
& Lead for
Secure Cyber
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Utility Perspective



Curley Henry
Executive Director,
Cyber Security
Strategy &
Architecture
Southern Company

Q&A



James Elsworth
Research Engineer,
National Renewable
Energy Laboratory

Cybersecurity and Distributed Energy Resources

Maurice Martin

Tami Reynolds



- National Renewable Energy Laboratory
- 12 years technology research for the electric utility industry
- Focus on security architectures for complex systems
- Previous work focused on small and under-resourced utilities and their cybersecurity challenges




- National Renewable Energy Laboratory
- Technical lead on the Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework (DERCF)
- Conducts cyber-governance assessments in the electric utility sector based on DOE's C2M2 and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Distributed Energy Resources (DERs)

IEEE 1547-2018

- “A source of electric power that is not directly connected to a bulk power system. DER includes both generators and energy storage technologies capable of exporting active power to an [electric power system].”



Includes:

- Solar
- Wind
- Hydro
- Batteries
- Biogas
- Fossil Fuel

What about controllable loads or demand response?

DERs in Developing Countries

- Isolated rural areas may not have transmission/distribution infrastructure
- Fossil fuel supply may be uncertain
- Fossil fuels may be expensive
- Environmental concerns
- Market growth in Argentina, Costa Rica, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, and Uruguay


DATA POINT

Kenya leads the world in solar power installations per capita.



Source: [Wikipedia](#)

DER Security Concerns



- Increase attack surface
- Mis-operation of resources to disrupt the grid
- Upstream attack
- Damage to equipment

Cyber Incident: Utah

- March 2019: Utah-based renewable energy provider (sPower) hit with a cyber attack
- Lost communication to its power generation installations
- Root cause: unpatched firewall




QUESTION:

Was sPower the intended target? Or were they caught up in an attack on another target (or no target at all)?

Source: [ZDNet](#)

DER Cybersecurity: An Intersection of Best Practices



- Utility best practices
- Must also account for distributed nature of DERs...
 - Cyber physical devices
 - Remote locations
 - Unsupervised
 - Weak physical security



Cybersecurity Assessment Research at NREL

- Research has identified cybersecurity vulnerabilities in operational technology components of distributed energy resource (DER) systems, such as PV inverters.
- If hacked, the DER output could be compromised in a way that disrupts the stability of the local distribution system.
- With the prevalence of DER deployed at federal sites, and an ongoing initiative to enhance and ensure energy resilience, the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of DER must be understood and addressed.

The Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework (DERCF)




The Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework (DERCF) was designed to help U.S. federal government agencies mitigate gaps in their cybersecurity posture for distributed energy systems.

DERCF: Both a Guide and an Online Tool

Guide:

- PDF, free to download and use
- Core Concepts
- Model Pillars
- Respective Domains
- References
- <https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy20osti/75044.pdf>



DERCF: Both a Guide and an Online Tool




The screenshot shows the registration page for the NREL Cybersecurity Assessment Tool for Distributed Energy. The page is split into two main sections: a dark blue left sidebar and a white right main area. The sidebar contains the NREL logo, the title 'Cybersecurity learning management system', a call to action 'Assess the cybersecurity maturity of your distributed energy resources. Let's get started!', and three icons for 'Standards', 'Controls', and 'Encryption'. The main area contains the title 'Cybersecurity Assessment Tool for Distributed Energy', a prompt to 'Fill in your details to create your account.', and a registration form with fields for First Name (John), Last Name (Doe), Email (John.Doe@nrel.gov), Password, and Password Confirm. There is a 'Sign in instead' link and a blue 'SUBMIT' button.

Online Tool:

- Publicly available interactive version of the DER-CF framework
- Hosted by NREL at www.dercf.nrel.gov
- User-focused assessment
- Detailed results & action items
- Userbase: Site operations, energy managers, executive managers
- Tailor assessment to individual site

Also... a fact sheet!

- PDF, free to download and use
- Quick overview of DER cybersecurity
- English: <https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy20osti/76307.pdf>
- Russian: <https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy20osti/76988.pdf>



Cybersecurity and Distributed Energy Resources

This fact sheet addresses cybersecurity for distributed energy resources (DERs) and identifies best practices in cybersecurity governance, technical management of cyber-physical systems, and physical security.

Growing Impact of DERs


DERs include wind, solar, battery storage, and other small-scale power devices connected at the grid edge. The deployment of DERs can support resilience through increasing overall and spatial diversity of generation resources. For example, a natural disaster or terrorist attack may remove a large, centralized generation facility from service, but dispersed DERs will not necessarily be impacted. Further enabling resilience, DERs can also be used to create "islandable" generation that continues to operate during outages. Lessons learned from widespread or longer duration outages have been used to inform more resilient DER design, as is the case in New Jersey following Hurricane Sandy ("New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Microgrid Report" 2016). Facilities with islanded generation can remain powered during a disruption, which can be particularly beneficial for critical facilities. Islanding can offer significant value in places where transmission or distribution systems may experience frequent faults caused by aging equipment, long delivery distances, shortages of trained staff with technical expertise in grid operations, extreme weather, or other factors.

Cyberattacks on the Electric Grid: Recent Examples

Year	Malware used	Target	Goal	Reference
2015	Lazik	Energy companies worldwide	Information-gathering	(Paganini 2015)
2015	BlackEnergy 3	Ukrainian electric distribution company	Power outage to 225,000 customers	(Lee, Assante, and Conway 2016)
2015-2017	Dragonfly 2.0	Energy companies in the Western United States	Information-gathering, potential access to operational systems	(Bisson 2017)
2016	Crash Override	Ukrainian electric transmission substation	Power outage to one-fifth of Kiev	(Greenberg 2017)
2019	Basic hacking toolkits	An electric utility in the Western United States	Disruption of internet-based communication	(Marks 2019)



While deployment of DERs has the potential to increase grid resilience, it also introduces new challenges to grid cybersecurity. Maintaining stable grid voltage and frequency requires entire fleets of DERs to work in a coordinated fashion, and that requires a control network connected to cyber-physical grid-edge devices. Both the control network and the devices become potential points of compromise. Ensuring the cybersecurity of DERs is, therefore, a necessary element of overall grid cybersecurity, and, thus, power sector resilience.

Fortunately, the cybersecurity best practices of many different domains can be used to inform DER cybersecurity (see Figure 1). Those best practices presented below represent a solid foundation for a comprehensive DER security program.¹




¹ The best practices for DER cybersecurity presented here are from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL's) Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DERCF), which itself draws from many sources. The DERCf is available at <https://dercf.nrel.gov>.

www.resilient-energy.org | www.nrel.gov/usaaid-partnership



DERCF Tool: Unique Features



- Dynamic content-driven approach
- Updated with evolution of research
- Internal-facing application to aid researchers based on user behavior
- User experience focused application, encourages re-use
- Data secured to meet FIPS-199 medium standards

Key Areas for DER Cybersecurity



Governance



Technical Management



Physical Security



Cyber Governance Security Assessment



Cyber-Physical Technical Management Security Assessment



Physical Security Assessment

Domains:

- ✓ • Risk Management
- Asset, Change, and Configuration
- Identity and Access Management
- ✓ • Threat and Vulnerability Management
- Situational Awareness
- ✓ • Information Sharing and Communication Management
- ✓ • Incident Response
- External Dependency Management
- ✓ • Cybersecurity Program Management

Domains:

- Account Management
 - Role-based access control*
 - Anomalous behavior in system logs*
- Configuration Management
 - Access restrictions*
 - Configuration settings*
 - Configuration change control*
 - Internal/external user management*
- Systems/Device Management
 - Fail-safe procedures*
 - Ports and input/output device access*
 - Cryptographic protection*
 - Software integrity/patch management*

Domains:

- Administration Controls
 - Audits*
 - Holistic security/contingency planning*
 - Personnel security planning*
- Asset Controls
 - Equipment*
 - Maintenance*
- Structure Controls
 - Distancing practices for sensitive assets*
 - Intrusion detection/prevention assets*
 - Response teams/force protection*

Example 1: Governance



Cyber Governance Security Assessment

Domains:

- Risk Management
- Asset, Change, and Configuration
- Identity and Access Management
- Threat and Vulnerability Management
- Situational Awareness
- Information Sharing and Communication Management
- Incident Response
- External Dependency Management
- Cybersecurity Program Management

Asset, Change, and Configuration Management

- What devices are on your system?
- What software is running on your system?
(Which version on which device?)
- How are these devices/systems configured?
- How to you test changes to the system?
- How do you track changes in the system as
new devices and software is added?

If you don't know what you have, you can't protect it.

Example 2: Technical Management



Cyber-Physical Technical Management Security Assessment

Domains:

- Account Management
 - Role-based access control*
 - Anomalous behavior in system logs*
- Configuration Management
 - Access restrictions*
 - Configuration settings*
 - Configuration change control*
 - Internal/external user management*
- Systems/Device Management
 - Fail-safe procedures*
 - Ports and input/output device access*
 - Cryptographic protection*
 - Software integrity/patch management*

Account Management

- Provisioning
- Role-based access
- Enforcing least privilege
- Preventing access “creep”
- Revoking access

How do you implement your security plan?

Example 3: Physical Security



Domains:

- Administration Controls
 - Audits*
 - Holistic security/contingency planning*
 - Personnel security planning*
- Asset Controls
 - Equipment*
 - Maintenance*
- Structure Controls
 - Distancing practices for sensitive assets*
 - Intrusion detection/prevention assets*
 - Response teams/force protection*

Administrative Controls

- Procedures and policies
- Personnel security
- Contingency planning
- Auditing (internal)
- Planning physical security (based on risk)

How do you secure devices that are attached to houses, poles, offices, or other public structures?

Summary

- The DERCF is a holistic tool for evaluating cybersecurity posture of sites with DER systems.
- Networked grid devices are now being controlled by consumers or third parties who are not fully aware of the need for cybersecurity.
- The DERCF offers a sharper focus on distributed energy technologies – and greater emphasis on physical security and technical management.
- Users will access DERCF-guided assessments through a web-based application or a downloadable document, which presents users with questions about security controls and practices that relate to their use of DERs.
- The DERCF web application tool will generate a score from the user's responses that indicates their current state of DER cybersecurity – and how they can improve.

Resources






- [DOE Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model \(C2M2\)](#)
- **Security and Privacy Controls:** [NIST 800-53](#),
- **Conducting Risk Assessments:** [NIST 800-30](#)
- **Industrial Control System Security:** [NIST 800-82](#)
- [NIST Cybersecurity Framework](#)
- [North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection \(NERC CIP\)](#)
- **Power Systems data and comms security:**
[International Electrotechnical Commission \(IEC\) 62351](#)

DERCF draws on the following standards and/or frameworks:

Managing Risk Related to New Distribution Energy Resources

Curley Henry
Executive Director
Southern Company Services

Agenda

- 01 Background 
- 02 Cybersecurity Approach 
- 03 Cybersecurity Characteristics & Risks 
- 04 Cybersecurity Considerations 
- 05 Q&A 

Background

Why DER?

Expanding the Business

- Resiliency
- Energy services
- Renewables



Leverage C&I Relationships

- New products and services



Technological Imperatives

- “Low-to-no carbon”
- Retire coal
- Build renewables, DER
- Carbon capture
- Storage



Reduce O&M

- Improve efficiencies
- Organizationally align



Regulated Capital

- Resiliency
- Grid Modernization
- Electrification




Regulator Innovation

- Rate design
- Regulatory entrepreneurship




Digitalization

- Technological efficiencies
- Big data
- Customer experience




Cybersecurity Approach

Technical Roadmap




Roadmap Summary



* Walk, jog, run as defined by DSPx nomenclature


High Level Future States



Cybersecurity Characteristics and Risks


Cybersecurity Risk to the Distributed Grid

Increased Cybersecurity Risk to the Distribution Grid



Cybersecurity Characteristics & Risks

Characteristics



Future State

- Decision makers tools to accurately & rapidly assess security risks
- Risk-based security for communication protection
- Strategic segmentation & isolation of communication network
- Self-healing communication network
- Security integration into operation and maintenance manuals
- AR/VR aided security training, incident response, and digital restoration
- Security training to OT personnel
- OT training for IT security personnel
- Clear common set of privacy regulations that are applicable to the majority of states
- Secure data storage and processing
- Effective anonymization / tokenization of data
- Devices are secure out-of-box
- Secure managed continuous automatic updates to software/firmware with in-time security validation
- Autonomous reporting and recovery

Risks



Cybersecurity Considerations

Cybersecurity Considerations



Recommendations

- Evaluate current risk management process to ensure cybersecurity risk is appropriately reported
 - Investigate ways to quantify security risks and operational performance to forecast the cyber investment in a long-term
- External engagement with regulators and industry groups to influence emerging cybersecurity standards (i.e., IEEE 1547.3, NIST, IEC, ...)
- Ensure cyber security concerns are addressed at the strategic level
 - Develop incident response plan for grid-edge systems (DER, DR, connected loads)

Summary

Summary

- **Cybersecurity delivers the following three strategic objectives:**
 - Minimize cybersecurity risks while maintaining productivity
 - Secure integration of clean energy resources
 - Manage impacts of cyber threats collaboratively with customers and 3rd parties
- **Key actions:**
 - Develop and socialize the risk management framework
 - Work with vendors and industry towards grid-edge security vision
 - Implement communication monitoring and assessment technologies for dynamic cybersecurity management
 - Develop data storage strategy to meet cybersecurity CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, availability)
- **Processes and retraining personnel will be required:**
 - Work collaboratively with the industry on cybersecurity standards and best practices
 - Cybersecurity training for OT personnel and OT training for IT security personnel
 - Incident report processes incorporating customer and 3rd parties

Questions & Answers



Next Webinar in this Series

July 16 @ 11 a.m. U.S. EDT (1500 GMT)

- **The Corporate Culture and Importance of Cyber Hygiene**

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Thank you!



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